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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGI FILED IN OFFICE 
VIKEN SECURITIES LIMITED, a foreign ) 
corporation, SPRINGBIRNE INVESTMENTS, INC., ) 
a foreign corporation, FELIPE SECURITIES ) 
LIMITED, a foreign corporation, VEENA ) 
MIRCHANDANI, SONIY A MIRCHANDANI, ) 







NA VIN DAD LAN I and ALICIA DADLANI, ) 
) 
Defendants. ' ) 
MAY 1 3 2015 
OEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
FULTON COUNTY, GA 
Civil Action No. 2014cv241970 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on all Defendants' 
Counterclaims 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to 
Defendants' Counterclaims. Plaintiffs in this action sued Defendant Navin and Alicia Dadlani 
for alleged false representations about an investment opportunity. Defendants Navin and Alicia 
Dadlani filed their Counterclaims on March 5, 2014 and amended their Counterclaims on 
January 29,2015. Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice on May 
13,2014, I and so the Counterclaims are the only pending claims in this case. Upon 
consideration of the briefs and materials submitted on the Motion, oral argument of counsel and 
the record of the case, this Court finds as follows: 
I Plaintiffs changed counsel and refiled a Renewed Complaint against Navin Dadlani only alleging breach 
of two contracts, breach of fiduciary duty, and promissory estoppel. Viken Securities Limited, et al., v. 
Navin Dadlani, 2014cv2502l5 (Fulton Sup. Ct.). These claims are not at issue for purposes of this Order 
and are discussed in a separate order seeking summary judgment on these claims. 
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By way of background only, the Counterclaims arise out of Plaintiffs' conduct after the 
Plaintiffs lost millions of dollars they invested in the Vision Fund through a British Virgin 
Islands company called Tiberius. Plaintiffs received notice in March of2009 that the Vision 
Fund had stopped paying out redemption requests or had "gated." Following the loss, Plaintiffs 
and other family members who are not named parties in this action.' blamed their nephew and 
cousin, Navin Dadlani, for his role in convincing them to invest in Vision Fund through Tiberius, 
and the family retained a UK lawyer, Keith Oliver of Peters & Peters, LLP, and a private 
investigator, Wayne Black, to conduct an investigation. Defendants have asserted the following 
Counterclaims against Plaintiffs: (1) Defamation, (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 
(3) Trespass, (4) Conspiracy, (5) Punitive Damages, (6) Attorneys' Fees, and (7) Breach of 
Indemnification Agreement. 
For purposes of the counterclaims, the evidence shows that Wayne Black visited the 
Dadlani home on March 14,2012 around 6:00 p.m. According to Mrs. Dadlani's testimony, she 
noticed Mr. Black's car in her driveway outside the gate by the call box, about one-third of the 
way up her driveway, as she was having dinner with her children. She testified he was there for 
about ten to fifteen minutes and the location of the car would prevent anyone from leaving the 
house. Mr. Black later reported the house was dark and there was a car in the driveway. Mrs. 
Dadlani testified the house can only be seen from the Dadlanis' property. Mrs. Dadlani never 
saw Mr. Black leave his car or had any contact with Mr. Black during this time, but could see a 
person taking pictures. Mrs. Dadlani testified she tried to locate her cell phone to call an off- 
2 PlaintiffYeena Mirchandani's husband, BK Mirchandani, and her son (Navin Dadlani's cousin), Suren 
Mirchandani, are non-parties but it appears that BK was the source of much of the family'S wealth and 
that his son, Suren, acted as a financial advisor for the family members and the corporate entities in which 
the family members had a stake. For clarity, the Court will refer to the Mirchandanis by first name. 
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duty officer who lived in the neighborhood, but she could not locate her phone. She did not try 
to call 9-1-1. 
Mrs. Dadlani also testified she received approximately twenty to forty calls that night 
from a number she did not recognize and she did not answer the phone calls. She finally 
answered a call at around 9:00 p.m. after putting her children to bed. Wayne Black identified 
himself as a private investigator hired by a UK law firm. He told Mrs. Dadlani he had been 
trying to contact her all day about Vision Fund and Tiberius and said Mr. Dadlani was involved 
in a criminal investment scheme and fraud. Mr. Black then stated he knew Mr. Dadlani was out 
of town and he wanted to meet with Mrs. Dadlani right away to discuss Mr. Dadlani's 
involvement in a Ponzi scheme. Mrs. Dadlani told Mr. Black not to call again or come back to 
her property. The Dadlanis rely on an email to show Mr. Black returned the next day, March 15, 
a fact that is disputed and Mr. Black denies. There is no testimony based on personal knowledge 
placing Mr. Black back at the property on March 15. 
Navin Dadlani testified he heard Plaintiffs were making defamatory statements about Mr. 
Dadlani to his father, sisters and deceased grandmother accusing Mr. Dadlani of stealing their 
money. There is no direct testimony from Navin's father, sisters, or now-deceased grandmother 
or any other evidence of defamatory statements against Navin. 
Navin Dadlani also claims that Suren Mirchandani offered him indemnification for his 
cooperation with the family's investigation into Tiberius and the Vision Fund. Navin Dadlani 
relies on an email dated October 31, 2011 from Suren that states Navin "may take this letter as 
mine and my Fathers [sic] assurances that, provided you cooperate fully and, it goes without 
saying, tell the complete truth, we will not use any of that information against you personally in 
any proceedings we are advised to pursue, and we will hold you harmless against any claims that 
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may be brought against you as a consequence of that truthful cooperation." Mr. Dadlani then 
attended a meeting on November 8-9,2011 with Mr. Oliver and Suren. According to the 
meeting minutes, Mr. Oliver stated "provided the process started today is one of complete 
cooperation, ... we are willing to indemnify [Navin Dadlani] against further proceedings." In his 
deposition, Suren testified he was acting on behalf of Plaintiffs Viken, Springbime, Felipe, 
Veena, Soniya, Asha, and Sajnee when he offered Navin indemnification. Following the 
agreement, Plaintiffs allowed an action pending in the U.K. to lapse. 
Summary judgment should be granted when the movant shows "there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). To avoid summary judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this Code section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial." § 9-11-56( e). "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge" and "shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in the evidence." Id. 
"Hearsay, opinions, and conclusions in affidavits are inadmissible on summary judgment." 
Langley v. Nat'l Labor Grp., Inc., 262 Ga. App. 749, 751 (2003). 
I. Trespass 
The Dadlanis assert Mr. Black committed trespass when he visited their home on March 
14,2012 at the direction of Plaintiffs. The right of enjoyment of private property is an absolute 
right of every citizen and an action will lie against anyone who unlawfully interferes with that 
enjoyment. O.C.G.A. § 51-9-1. Under Georgia law, "a trespasser is one who, though peacefully 
or by mistake, wrongfully enters upon property owned or occupied by another." Lee v. S. 
Telecom Co., 303 Ga. App. 642, 644 (2010) (citations omitted). Georgia law recognizes the 
4 
doctrine of the innocent trespasser, and while the issue of whether the trespass was willful or 
innocent is generally for the jury to decide, the Court has, in some circumstances ruled on this 
issue as a matter of law. See id. (reversing grant of summary judgment on trespass claim); but 
see C. W Matthews Contracting Co., Inc. v. Wells, 147 Ga. App. 457, 458 (1978) (finding 
contractor was an innocent trespasser as a matter of law and holding the trial court erred in 
denying motion for directed verdict). Here, there is no evidence Mr. Black acted willfully. To 
the contrary, Mr. Black did not go any further than the gate and the call box and there is no other 
evidence Mr. Black was asked to leave in the 10 to 15 minutes he was in the driveway. As such, 
the Court believes this claim would not stand even if brought directly against Mr. Black, which it 
is not. 
Even ifMr. Black's actions constituted a wrongful trespass, the Dadlanis have not 
presented any evidence imputing Mr. Black's trespass to Plaintiffs. "The principal s~all not be 
liable for the willful trespass of his agent unless done by his command or assented to by him." 
O.C.G.A. § 10-6-61. Mr. Black averred he was not directed to act by Plaintiffs and he was 
acting as an independent contractor, not an agent. There is no evidence Plaintiffs directed Mr. 
Black to visit the Dadlani's home, much less that Plaintiffs directed him to trespass upon the 
property. The Dadlanis point to an email chain between Mr. Black, Suren and Mr. Oliver sent 
the day after Mr. Black visited the property' as evidence Plaintiffs ratified the trespass. To the 
contrary, Mr. Black reported the house was dark, there was a car in the driveway, and he spoke 
to Alicia by phone and she was alone with her children so he did not want to knock on the door 
after dark. Mr. Black did not notify Suren or Mr. Oliver he had trespassed. It follows that 
without evidence that Mr. Black notified Suren or Mr. Oliver of the trespass, there can be no 
3 There is a disagreement about the time stamps for the emails since all three recipients were in different 
time zones, but the first email in the chain is a report from Wayne Black about his attempts to meet with 
and call Mrs. Dadlani, 
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evidence that they ratified the trespass on their own behalf or on the behalf of Plaintiffs. As the 
Dadlanis have failed to present evidence that non-party Mr. Black's alleged trespass was directed 
or ratified by Plaintiffs, the motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim for trespass is 
GRANTED. 
II. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The Dadlanis also claim Mr. Black was hired with the intention of harassing and 
intimidating the Dadlanis and Mr. Black's actions caused Mrs. Dadlani emotional distress. To 
recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a party must show four elements: "(1) the 
conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the conduct 
caused emotional distress and (4) the emotional distress was severe." Amstadter v. Liberty 
Heathcare Corp., 233 Ga. App. 240, 242-43 (1998). "Whether a claim rises to the requisite 
level of outrageousness and egregiousness to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress is a question oflaw." Vidrine v. Am. Prof'l Credit, Inc., 223 Ga. App. 357, 
359 (1996). Insults, threats, annoyances, and petty annoyances are not enough; the conduct 
"must be of such serious import as to naturally give rise to such intense feelings of humiliation, 
embarrassment, fright or extreme outrage as to cause severe emotional distress." Moses v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 187 Ga App 222, 225 (1988) (affirming summary judgment because 
supervisor leaving a telephone message threatening former employee that he would "find your 
butt in court or your neck broken somewhere" was not egregious or outrageous as a matter of 
law); see also Ghodrati v. Stearnes, 314 Ga App 321 (2012) (affirming summary judgment 
because anxiety and sleeplessness caused by co-worker's racist and derogatory name-calling and 
signs in the workplace were not sufficiently severe emotional distress). 
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Here, Mr. Black's actions were not so outrageous or egregious they would naturally give 
rise to the type of severe emotional distress that would be actionable under Georgia law. The 
uncontroverted evidence shows that although Mrs. Dadlani considered calling for help, she did 
not. Although the phone kept ringing, she testified she was able to read her children a story and 
put them to bed before deciding to answer the phone. There is no evidence Mr. Black attempted 
to contact Mrs. Dadlani after she told him to stop. As such, the Court finds as a matter oflaw the 
conduct did not rise to the level of egregiousness contemplated under Georgia law and Mrs. 
Dadlani's alleged emotional distress did not rise to a severe level that is actionable. 
Further, even ifMr. Black's actions were sufficiently egregious and outrageous, there is 
no evidence Plaintiffs are liable for Mr. Black's actions as a contractor. See O.C.G.A. § 51-2- 
5(5) (requiting ratification of the unauthorized wrong act of the independent contractor). Mr. 
Black, Suren, and Mr. Oliver are not themselves parties to this suit and there is no evidence Mr. 
Black's investigatory methods were directed or controlled by any of these three men, much less 
the Plaintiffs. 
To the extent the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress has been raised by 
Mr. Dadlani, there is no evidence of any egregious acts towards him within the two year statute 
oflimitations or any evidence of resultant emotional distress. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 ("Actions 
for injuries to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues, ... "). 
As such, the motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress is GRANTED. 
III. Defamation 
Mr. Dadlani claims Plaintiffs defamed him. "Generally, there are four elements in a 
cause of action for defamation: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) 
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an unprivileged communication to a third party; (3) fault by the defendant amounting at least to 
negligence; and (4) special harm or the actionability of the statement irrespective of special 
harm." Renton v. Watson, 319 Ga. App. 896, 900, (2013) (citations omitted). Damage is 
inferred when the defamatory statements "imput[ e] to another a crime punishable by law" or 
"mak] es] charges against another in reference to his trade, office, or profession, calculated to 
injury him therein." O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4 (a) & (b). A defamation claim must provide "notice of 
both the content of the allegedly defamatory statements and the context in which those 
statements were made." Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 170 (2013) (emphasis added). The 
statute of limitations for a defamation claim is one year, and therefore, evidence of statements 
made prior to March 5, 2013 will be disregarded. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 ("Actions for injuries 
to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues, except for 
injuries to the reputation, which shall be brought within one year after the right of action accrues, 
... ). 
Here, Navin Dadlani claims the Plaintiff Individuals were making defamatory statements 
about Mr. Dadlani to his father, sisters and deceased grandmother accusing Mr. Dadlani of 
stealing their money. However, the only evidence of these defamatory statements is 
inadmissible hearsay-Navin himself testified he was told Plaintiffs told these various family 
members that he stole money. There is no direct testimony from Navin's father, sisters or now- 
deceased grandmother about the alleged defamation of Navin. Navin Dadlani has failed to 
produce a letter, email, affidavit, or other evidence of a defamatory statement made by or on 
behalf of any of the Plaintiffs after March 5, 2013. Furthermore, there is no evidence the 
corporate defendants directed the individual Plaintiffs to make defamatory statements or the 
individual Plaintiffs were agents of the corporations at all. See, e.g., Desmond v. Troncalli 
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Mitsubishi, 243 Ga App 71,75 (2000) (affirming summary judgment because there was no 
evidence that corporation directed, authorized, or ratified statements made by its employees). As 
such, the motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim for defamation of Navin Dadlani is 
GRANTED. 
IV. Indemnification 
Plaintiffs argue Mr. Dadlani's claim for indemnity should be dismissed because he 
waived his right to be indemnified when he failed to provide requested documents on December 
7,2011. In an October 31,2011 email, Suren offered indemnity and to hold Navin Dadlani 
harmless for anything discovered during an interview in November in exchange for Mr. 
Dadlani's cooperation. Mr. Dadlani attended the November meeting and Plaintiffs allowed the 
UK litigation to lapse. However, Mr. Dadlani refused Suren's attorneys' request for information 
in early December and when Suren threatened legal action, Mr. Dadlani stated in an email there 
was nothing he could do to stop him and he would not try. While waiver is normally a question 
for the jury, the Court may decide the issue as a matter of law when the facts and circumstances 
essential to the waiver issue are clearly established. See Forsyth County v. Waterscape Servs., 
LLC, 303 Ga. App. 623, 630 (2010) (citation omitted). From Mr. Dadlani's email it is clear that 
he was no longer willing to cooperate even if that meant being subjected to legal action and 
waiving his right to indemnity. 
Further, the application of indemnity provisions contained in written contracts is a 
question oflaw for the court. See Georgia Ports Auth. v. Harris, 243 Ga. App. 508, 513 (2000) 
aff'd, 274 Ga. 146, (2001) (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Williams, 183 Ga.App. 845, 
846(2) (1987». Even if the indemnity provision was enforceable and had not been waived, 
Plaintiffs are suing Mr. Dadlani on two purported contracts from 2009 and 2010, not based on 
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information gleaned from him at the November 2011 meeting. Therefore, even if the indemnity 
agreement was given effect, there is no evidence the agreement would apply to this case. As 
such, the motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim for indemnification is GRANTED. 
V. Conspiracy, Punitive Damages, and Attorneys' Fees 
"To recover damages for a civil conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must show that two or more 
persons, acting in concert, engaged in conduct that constitutes a tort." "Absent the underlying 
tort, there can be no liability for civil conspiracy." Wilson v. Mountain Valley Cmty. Bank, 328 
Ga. App. 650,652 (2014), reconsideration denied (July 30, 2014), cert. denied (Feb. 2, 2015) 
(citation omitted). As Defendants have failed to present any evidence supporting the underlying 
tort counterclaims, the counterclaim for conspiracy also fails and, as such, the motion for 
summary judgment on the counterclaim for conspiracy is GRANTED. 
Likewise, "[t]he derivative claims of attorney fees and punitive damages will not lie in 
the absence of a finding of compensatory damages on an underlying claim." D. G. Jenkins 
Homes, Inc. v. Wood, 261 Ga. App. 322,325 (2003) (citing Wade v. Culpepper, 158 Ga. App. 
303, 305 (1981 ). As such, the motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims for punitive 
damages and attorneys' fees is GRANTED. 
SO ORDERED, this 11th day of May, 2015. 
~\<__. ~~~ . 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs: Attorneys for Defendants: 
Bryan M. Knight Richard L. Robbins 
Nick T. Sears Vincent Russo 
KNIGHT JOHNSON, LLC Robbins Ross Alloy Belinfante Littlefield, 
One Midtwon Plaza LLC 
1360 Peachtree Street 999 Peachtree Street, N.E. 
Suite 1201 Suite 1120 
Atlanta, Georgia 30309 Atlanta, GA 30309 
bknight@knightjohnson.com Tel: (678) 701-9381 
nsears@knightjohnson.com Fax: (404) 601-6733 
lTobbins@robbinsfinn.com 
vrusso@robbinsfirm.com 
Cynthia M. Monaco 
The Law Offices of Cynthia M. Monaco 
The Fred French Building 
551 Fifth Avenue, 31st Fl. 
New York, NY 10176 
(646) 380-2456 
cmonaco@cY!}thiamonacolaw.com 
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